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UMPffiE TO THE FEDERAL SYSTEM* 
GEORGE D. BRADENt 
H AND in hand together, Due Process and the Commerce Clause amble across the pages of the United States Reports. Though one is supposed to provide a balance between the individual and 
his government and the other between state and nation, they have more 
or less been interchangeable devices for protecting the status quo against 
social legislation. A Court which struck down state legislation in the 
name of the Fourteenth Amendment was usually a Court which also found 
a negative implication in the Commerce Clause to prevent state regulation 
of interstate business.1 And except for certain traditional types of com-
merce2 and a few pronouncements of the Taft Court, 3 the Commerce 
Clause hardly seemed a strong affirmative instrument for national regu-
lation. By adept manipulation of these two constitutional provisions the 
Court steadily erected a no man's land free from any governmental regu-
lation.4 In fact, the primary objective of no-regulation finally became so 
important that the Court lost its adeptness and in one instance confused 
the two concepts by saying in effect that the Commerce Clause did not 
extend to regulation of commerce if the regulation was without due proc-
ess of law.5 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find that when the new Court 
launched its campaign to undo past wrongs, it moved on three fronts at 
* The title is a subtitle of an article Walton Hamilton and I published last year, in which 
we did no more than hint at some of the problems here discussed. See Hamilton and Braden, 
The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, so Yale L. J. I319, 1367-69 (I941). It goes 
without saying that I am greatly indebted to Mr. Hamilton, but fortunately for him I must 
assume all the responsibility for what is said here. 
t Member of the Indiana Bar now serving with the Armed Forces. 
1 Compare Allgeyer v. Louisiana, I65 U.S. 578 (1897), with Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 
I7I U.S. I (1898), and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); and DiSanto v. 
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), with Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 4I8 (I927), and 
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (I928). 
• Such as transportation, foreign co=erce, and, within the limits of reason, antitrust. 
3 See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. I, 40 (1923); Corwin, The Schechter 
Case-Landmark or•What?, I3 N.Y. U. L. Q. Rev. I5I, I67-69 (1936). 
4 It is unnecessary to parade the sorry cluster of cases which resulted from the nullification 
spree i=ediately preceding the Court Unpacking Bill. 
s Railroad Retiiement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). See Powell, Co=erce, 
Pensions, and Codes, 49 Harv. L. Rev. I, 4-6 (I935). 
27 
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once. It virtually eliminated Due Process as a bar to social legislation/ 
it expanded the Commerce Clause to permit extensive nation8.1 regula-
tion, 7 and it chipped away at the negative force of the clause. 8 The domi-
nant driving force behind this three-pronged advance was a conviction 
that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the competent agent to act in the 
social and economic :field.9 There was obviously an effort to keep the 
Court out of all areas in which decision could be made only on the basis of 
personal, economic, or political predilections. In large measure this effort 
was successful. By shutting off Due Process and by granting Congress al-
most free rein, local and national action was freed from restraint. But on 
the third front, the negative side of the Commerce Clause, a more cau-
tious advance has been made. 
The necessity for cautious action is obvious. Although the argument 
that a state statute burdens interstate commerce may be only so much 
theoretical balancing of governmental powers, it may also be an effective 
way to prevent one state from mulcting the outlander, or from erecting 
tariff barriers against national competition. It requires considerable dis-
crimination to detect when there is a real burden on national commerce 
and not just a slight burden on some reluctant individual doing interstate 
business. If the Court is unthinking, its action in closing off Due Process 
may be wasted because those who used to invoke that clause soon shift 
ground and come running into court with the cry that interstate commerce 
is burdened. True, there is no longer a no man's land so long as the Court 
• 6 The statute considered in Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941), and People of Puerto Rico 
v. Russell & Co., 62 S. Ct. 784 (1942), involved impairment of the obligation of a contract. I 
know of no statute thrown out in the past three terms on substantive due process grounds. 
1 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), is a sufficient example of expansion. United 
States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. no (1942), and Kirschbaum v. Walling, 62 S. Ct. 
nx6 (1942), are more recent instances of the same trend. 
s See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. x (1940). Since 
Dowling wrote, California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941), and Duckworth v. Arkansas, 
314 U.S. 390 (1941), have continued the trend. 
9 See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) ("We are not concerned, however, with 
the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation"); Wisconsin v J. C. Penney Co., gn 
U.S. 435, 445 (1940) ("Nothing can be less helpful than for courts to go beyond the extremely 
liinited restrictions [of] the Constitution .•.. "); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 
310 U.S. 381, 394 (1940) ("Those matters .... relate to questions of policy, to the wisdom 
of the legislation, and to the appropriatene~ of the remedy chosen-matters which are not for 
our concern"); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 66 (1940) ("All these are questions of policy 
not for us to judge"); Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 320 (1940) 
("The wisdom of such a policy-its efficacy to achieve the desired ends-is of course not our 
concern"); McCarroll v.. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 189 (1940); Polk v. Glover, 
305 U.S. s, 16 (1938); Indiana v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, II7 (1938). 
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permits Congress to regulate or to sanction state regulation. But in the 
period, short or long, during which no congressional action is forthcoming, 
active use of the Commerce Clause enables the Court to dabble with social 
legislation. And in this narrow area the Court must exercise that inde-
pendent judgment of social values which it eschews in other :fields. 
There are two ways out of this situation. One is for the Court to evolve 
rules for determining when state legislation is really a burden on com-
merce and when it is not.'0 This has been the path taken by Mr. Chief 
Justice Stone.n It has not been accepted by all the Court, however, for it 
requires judicial weighing of the practical operation of legislation, a task 
the Court is said to be unable to fulfil well through lack of proper perspec-
tive, and a task some of the justices do not care to undertake because it is 
legislative in nature.12 Accordingly, Mr. Justice Black has evolved a the-
sis concurred in in varying degrees by other justices, which purports to 
complete the Court's self-effacement in policy-making :fields. He says, in 
effect, that if state legislation on its face discriminates against commerce 
he will strike it down,X3 but if any quarrel arises over whether there is dis-
crimination in fact, he will quit and toss the problem to Congress.14 Un-
less justices quarrel about whether legislation is discriminatory on its face, 
or, in other words, if the justices see discrimination only where everyone 
else would, Justice Black's rule is one which narrows the area in which the 
Court exercises a veto power over a legislature's political decision. So far 
he has participated in knocking out only two statutes under this rule,xs 
and although they were unanimous opinions, there is no proof what use he 
will make of the rule, since he is probably the justice least likely to strike 
down discriminatory legislation. To date it is possible to say only that the 
justice, with such supporters as have joined him, has given no indication 
that he will overuse this modicum of power under the Commerce Clause. 
The other half of the rule is a different matter entirely. Aside from this 
•• See Dowling, op. cit. supra note 8. 
n His classic statement is in South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
,. See the dissent of Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ., in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940). 
'3 See his dissents in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938); Gwin, White & •• 
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434. 446 (1939). 
'4 See the dissent of Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ., in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound 
Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940). 
•s Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 3II U.S. 454 (194o); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 
(1939). Note that Justice Black agreed with Justice Douglas' concurrence in Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 16o (1941), which relied on privileges and immunities and not on the 
co=erce clause as used by the majority opinion. 
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narrow power to invalidate which is drawn directly and independently 
from the Constitution and the nature of a federal system, the main 
strength of the rule is derived from a judicial recognition of the predomina-
tion of congressional power over state power. Even in the old days when 
there was a more extensive use of the negative aspect of the Commerce 
Clause, the same theory obtained. Then the Court acted on a presump-
tion that Congress wished the channels of commerce to be unobstructed, 
which meant that Congress had to announce that a given type of state 
regulation was valid notwithstanding the Commerce Clause.x6 The pres-
ent Court has done no more than shift the presumption around so far as 
nondiscriminatory legislation is concerned. Now the Court presumes 
that so long as Congress is silent, it does not care whether commerce is 
trammelled. Congress need only speak and petty obstructions vanish. In 
theory this entirely removes the Court from the field of policy making. In-
stead of undertaking to preserve the federal system from hidden or ques-
tionable instances of Balkanization, it can sit back passively and let one 
organ of the electorate, Congress, save the country from the shortsighted 
selfish action of lesser organs of smaller groups of people, state legisla-
tures. Thus, the theory virtually completes the three-sided advance of 
the Court against appeal to its power to strike down economic legislation. 
In practice, however, policy making rears its head in a new guise. 
Granted that legislatures have the last word and that the Court sits back 
and waits for Congress to override states, the Court's work has only be-
gun. The problem of applying the congressional command is not so sim-
ple as it was under the old theory of presumption when congressional ac-
tion took the form of a lifting of the bans. Now the Court must take af-
firmative congressional legislation by the four comers, study it, and de-
cide whether it forecloses all state action; or, to use Mr. Justice Roberts' 
plan for matching allegedly conflicting documents, lay the congressional 
enactment which is invoked beside the state statute which is challenged 
and see whether the latter conflicts with the former.x7 When former 
Courts laid statute beside Constitution to divine the constitutional an-
swer, economic predilections quickly came to their aid. The question is 
whether statute matching may not exhibit the same tendency. 
Admittedly, the problem is more complex than was the constitutional 
egerdemain. The constitutional provisions remained constant and were 
comparatively simple statements. Federal statutes come along in a never 
slackening stream, and are highly complex. Naturally, Congress might 
16See generally Bickle, The Silence of Congress, 4I Harv. L. Rev. 200 (r927). 
1 7 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. r, 62 (r936). 
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say that a given statute "hereby supplants all state statutes in this fi.eld."x8 
But this would still require the Court to decide whether a state statute 
was in the field, and, more rarely, to decide whether Congress could con-
stitutionally foreclose all state action. The trouble is, however, that the 
Court is not aided even in this slight way. Congress has usually been con-
tent simply to legislate on a subject without consideration of conflicts. 
The Court is left with the task of evolving criteria for deciding when there 
is conflict and when there is not. 
In the emerging pattern of current constitutional law, this problem of 
federal pre-emption and federal conflict becomes of utmost importance. 
Once the Court declines to invalidate state statutes for constitutional in-
firmity, and at the same time greatly expands federal power in order to 
avoid no man's lands, it has opened the gates for a flood of potential con-
flicts. It has .also opened the gates to considerable potential judicial 
sleight of hand, for so long as Congress keeps quiet about what it consid-
ers is a conflict, the Court has no more constraining rules of decision than 
it did when the Due Process and Commerce Clauses were the rules of de-
cision. After all, the legal proposition is simple: When Congress exercises 
its plenary power, all state statutes which conflict with the federal exer-
cise become invalid. This is a truism, of course, and gets nowhere. The 
task is to find the "inarticulate major premise" which lies behind the ap-
plication of this empty legal rule to the facts of a given case. 
THE RENOVATED BUTTER CASE 
The most important of the recent cases dealing with conflicts between 
federal and state legislation is Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson.x9 There 
Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Justices Roberts, Black, Douglas, and Jack-
son, found a conflict between the Renovated Butter Act20 and an Ala-
bama statute providing for seizure of adulterated and misbranded food.2x 
The federal statute provides for seizure of renovated butter and for inspec-
tion of factories manufacturing it. There is no power under the Renovated 
Butter Act to seize the ingredients of renovated butter.22 Under the Ala-
,s This may be done by using the word "exclusive" in an appropriate context. See the 
Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o (a) (Supp. 1941); the United States Ware-
housing Act, 46 Stat. 1465 (1931), 7 U.S.C.A. § 269 (1939). 
'9 315 U.S. 148 (1942). 
20 Int. Rev. Code, 53 Stat. 252 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 232o-2327 (1940). 
2
' Ala. Code Ann. {Mitchie, 1940) tit. 2, § 495· 
22 The Court states that adulterated packing stock, an ingredient of renovated butter, 
can be seized and condemned under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. 52 Stat. 1046 
(1938), 21 U.S.C.A. § 342 (Supp. 1941). Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 163 
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bama statute as construed by the Court, seizure of ingredients of renovat-
ed butter is authorized. Pursuant to this latter statute, Alabama officials 
seized large quantities of packing stock butter, from which renovated but-
ter is made, belonging to the Cloverleaf Butter Company. In protest the 
company brought an equity action in a federal district court to enjoin the 
seizures on the ground that the Renovated Butter Act pre-empted the 
field and· invalidated any seizures by state officials. The case went up on a 
stipulation which did not disclose whether the seizures were justified un-
der the Alabama act, whether they were made with the approval of federal 
inspectors, whether the Federal Government had been seizing any of the 
company's completed product, or whether the state officials had been 
seizing any of the completed product offered for sale in Alabama. Only 
the two statutes were before the Court. No extensive facts such as are 
called for in constitutionaf cases•3 were on hand to aid the Court. 
As.might well be expected, both the majority and minority opinions 
state the applicable rule in substantially the same words. Mr. Justice 
Reed said that "where the United States exercises its power of legisla-
tion so as to conflict with a regulation of the state, either specifically or 
by implication, the state legislation becomes inoperative and the federal 
legislation exclusive in its application.""4 But, he conceded, "When the 
prohibition of state action is not specific but inferable from the scope and 
purpose of the federal legislation, it must be clear that the federal provi-
sions are inconsistent with those of the state to justify the thwarting of 
state regulation.""5 For the minority Mr. Chief Justice Stone put it that 
"Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional authority, 
~not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state statute de-
signed to protect the health and safety of the public unless the state act, 
in terms or in its practical administration, conflicts with the act of Con-
gress or plainly and palpably infringes its policy."•6 Both agreed that if 
there is an e.xpress prohibition, the state act falls. Such is not the case 
(1942). Nothing is made of this, however, and we may assume that the case stands for a con-
flict between only the federal Renovated Butter Act and the state statute. In fact, the Chief 
Justice observed in dissent that the Department of Agriculture has praised the action of state 
officials in seizing adulterated packing stock while Food and Drug officials were preparing a 
libel in federal courts. It is ironical, he said, that a company can escape seizure because of a 
conflict with a statute not allowing seizure, when no conflict has been found with a statute al-
lowing seizure. Ibid., at 176. 
23 See Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940); Polk v. Glover, 
305 U.S. 5 (1938); Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934). 
2 4 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942). 
25 Ibid. 2 6 Ibid., at 170. 
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here, and there is little likelihood of a divided Court where it is the case. 
The dispute arises because a conflict must be implied. Mr. Justice Reed 
requires "clearness" under these circi.unstances; Mr. Chief Justice Stone, 
a "plain or palpable" infringement or conflict. Except for the fact that 
Mr. Justice Reed more or less implies a presumption in favor of :finding a 
conflict whereas the Chief Justice balances the preservation of fed-
eralism against paramount federal power, the two statements say the 
same thing. Obviously, the differences between the groups of justices 
must be sought elsewhere.2 7 
A closer study of the majority opinion yields little that is more enlight-
ening. Mr. Justice Reed first sought to demonstrate the operation of this 
principle by contrasting two old cases dealing with the Pure Food and 
Drug Act. In Savage v. Jones/8 he noted, the Court upheld an Indiana 
statute which required "disclosure of formulas on foods offered for sale in 
Indiana while in interstate commerce. " 29 But in McDermott v. Wisconsin, 30 
it was pointed out, the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute which "re-
quired glucose mixtures offered for retail sale to be labeled 'Glucose fla-
vored with' the flavoring material. Any other 'designation or brand' on 
the package was prohibited."Jr The justice then produced two quota-
tio:g.s, one from each case, which were supposed to give the rationales, and 
concluded with the statement: "In the Savage case there was no conflict, 
inconsistency or interference; in the McDermott case there was."32 
These cases of contrast are not happy ones. Certainly, they do not offer 
a distinction that is arresting in its sharpness. In both instances, the 
products conformed to the requirements of the Pure Food and Drug Act. 
Both state acts required certain statements not required by the Pure Food 
and Drug Act. The Indiana statute required an exact statement of in-
gredients; the Wisconsin act, a partially exact statement of ingredients. 
Yet the former was valid, the latter was not. Nor are the quotations set 
out by Mr. Justice Reed of much help. One says the Indiana statute does 
not conflict with the Food and Drug Act;33 the other says the Wisconsin 
statute does.34 But why? Mr. Justice Reed let the cat out of the bag 
when he observed that the Food and Drug Act "tolerated the more euphe.: 
mistic label prohibited by [Wisconsin]."35 In other words, the Food and 
2 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter added a few dissenting words of his own. Ibid., at r77-79. 
28 225 u.s. sor (rgr2). 
2 ~ Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 3I5 U.S. r48, rs7-58 (r942). 
3° 228 u.s. IIS (I9I3)· 
3I Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 3I5 u.s. I48, rs8 (I942). 
32 Ibid., at I59· 33 Ibid., at rs8. 34 Ibid. 3SJbid. 
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Drug Act did not destroy Indiana's power "to prevent imposition upon the 
public" by concealing ingredients, but it did destroy Wisconsin's power to 
require a special label which said the same thing as the label permitted 
under the federal act, only less "euphemistically," and perhaps in a way 
that discouraged purchase of the product.36 This rationale leads to a 
rule which might be stated thus: If the state statute does a Good Thing 
which the federal statute does not, no conflict; but if the state statute re-
quires a stupid variation on a Good Thing that the federal statute does, 
conflict. Stated another way, it might be said that if the state statute re-
quires more of a Good Thing-here truthful and informative labeling-
than the federal statute does, no conflict; but if the state statute does not 
require more of a Good Thing, and in fact is considered a stupid require-
ment, conflict. But Mr. Justice Reed would undoubtedly repudiate any 
such deduction and perhaps it is best to forget this attempt to deduce 
contrasting rules from old cases and seek a more direct argument in his 
own opinion. 
The only other argument which can be used is a factual demonstration 
of the conflict. The conflict, Mr. Justice Reed states,37 takes the form of 
a destruction of the effectiveness of the inspection provisions of the Reno-
vated Butter Act. Finished products may be seized if they are unsuitable 
"forfood through the use of unhealthful or unwholesome materials .... " 38 
and this may be determined "upon observation of the use of such 
materials in the process of manufacture."39 Further, federal regulations 
and inspections see to the "sanitation of the factories in such minu-
tiae as the clean hands of the employees and the elimination of objection-
able odors ..... "4° If state officials can seize ingredients, "federal discre-
tion" over them is nullified. Later he says that state seizure of material 
"while federal enforcement deemed it wholesome, would not only hamper 
the administration of the federal act but would be inconsistent with its 
requirements.''4X 
These then are the Court's reasons for finding a conflict. Apparently, 
state regulation must fall because it is possible that state officials might 
find some ingredients unwholesome which the federal officials would not 
36 I do not deny that the Wisconsin statute was pretty stupid, and obviously designed to 
discourage importation into the state of Karo and similar syrups; see the dissenting opinion 
in the state court. McDermott v. State, 143 Wis. r8, 38, 126 N.W. 888, 893 (rgro). But 
if this was the rationale, out with it .. Cf. infra p. 37· 
37 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, r68 (1942). 
38 Ibid. 4• Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 4I Ibid., at r6g. 
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:find so unwholesome that they would seize the :finished product. So far 
as this situation is concerned, it represents a government of men and not of 
laws, for the legislative standards of unwholesomeness are substantially 
the same42 and the only conflict arises because men might differ. For Con-
gress to allow concurrent action in these circumstances, it must affirma-
tively grant the state permission to seize. If this analysis be correct, the 
old presumption against state interference with interstate commerce 
shows up in a new guise. There is now a presumption that if somewhere 
along the line a possible disagreement over a set of facts might arise be-
tween federal and state officials, Congress meant to exclude state action. 
This analysis reveals, perhaps, why the Court was willing to rely on 
such cases as Savage v. J ones43 and McDermott v. Wisconsin. 44 A reading of 
those cases reveals a mental attitude of caution in allowing state police 
power to interfere with interstate commerce, a mental attitude that also 
caused police power to have an uphill battle in combating laissez-faire. 
The majority in the Renovated Butter case revive to some extent this 
laissez-faire situation, for if Congress unwittingly passes a general statute 
which can conceivably be construed to create a disagreement between a 
state and federal official, a state statute must go. And this will probably 
mean that some business interest will be less stringently regulated than 
otherwise. It is not at all certain, for example, that the renovated butter 
produced in Alabama will always be free from the impurities which might 
be removed by that state's officials. To assure such purity it must be as-
sumed that impurities can always be detected in the :finished product, and 
that examinations of it are always made, or that federal inspection of 
packing stock butter is complete and that the inspectors never lose track 
of the impure ingredients and hence always confiscate the processed butter 
when it comes through.4s Since this is rather unlikely, it follows that the 
Court, acting in the name of congressional intent, partly frees an inter-
state industry from supervision. 
The net result of the Court's decision, therefore, seems to be a judicial 
exercise of power over economic legislation. Congress can control the 
power, to be sure, and the Court can claim it does no more than presume 
42 See Int. Rev. Code, 53 Stat. 252 (r939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 2325 (I940) ("deleterious or un-
wholesome"); Ala. Code Ann. (Mitchie, I94o) tit. 2, § 306 ("poisonous or deleterious"). 
43 225 u.s. SOI (I9I2). 
44 228 u.s. IIS (I9I3). 
45 See Mr. Chief Justice Stone's dissent on this polli.t. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 
3IS U.S. I48, I7I-73 (r942). Conceivably, impurities might be removed in the processing. 
But this is apparently doubtful. See the quotation in the dissenting opinion. Ibid., at I73 n. 3· 
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congressional intent to avoid this sort of conflict. The fact remains, how-
ever, that within the limits of the Court's rule it has said the final word, 
and has thrust the burden on Congress to legislate carefully in order to 
be positive that a sleeping presumption will not arise. Within these limits, 
the Court exercises the same negative power it exercises under the Com-
merce Clause. 
In fact, it may be that a solicitude for the elimination of interstate 
trade barriers lies behind this presumption of congressional intent. Both 
Justices Roberts and Reed, of the majority here, dissented in West India 
Oil Co. v. Domenech,46 which allowed Puerto Rico to tax fuel oil imports 
despite an act of Congress which could be interpreted to forbid such taxa-
tion. "Nothing," Mr. Justice Reed observed, "requires us to frustrate the 
legislative policy of free competition in world markets."47 And Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson, also of the majority, has been quite frank in admitting that 
the trend toward interstate trade barriers is something "with which [he] 
would have no part," and that he would be willing to use his power to 
hamper the trend. 48 If these justices do not really care for the theory that 
trade barriers should usually be ~liminated only by Congress, it is likely 
that they will sooner find a conflict with a federal statute than others 
might. Not only do they have an additional opportunity to strike a blow 
at a trade barrier; they can do it more easily because Congress has spoken 
and thereby created a judicial tool more tangible and handier than the 
Commerce Clause. If Alabamians protest, they will do so to Capitol Hill, 
not the Court. 
Though Justices Roberts, Reed, and Jackson may be reviving judicial 
power to supervise the national economy in a negative sort of way, Jus-
tices Black and Douglas, the remaining members of the majority, cannot 
be so easily explained away. They are the men of the Dixie Greyhound dis-
sent49 which so frightened the opponents of Balk.anization.so And Justice 
Black is the exponent par excellence of the theory of judicial self-abnega-
tion.SX Why should these men suddenly indulge in a dubious presumption 
of congressional intent. in order to eliminate a state statute, probably 
passed after a "careful and cautious consideration given to the matter," 
46 3n U.S. 20 (1940). 47 Ibid., at 32. 
48 Concurring in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 401-2 (1941), 
49 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940). 
5• See McAllister, Court, Congress and Trade Barriers, 16 Ind. L. J. 144 (1940); Dickinson, 
The Functions of Congress and the Courts in Umpiring the Federal System, 8 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. n6s (1940). 
51 See supra p. 29. · 
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by a legislature of reasonable men?s2 It may well be that there is some-
thing undisclosed about this case, such as a fight between federal and state 
officials which could be arrested only by invalidating the state statute. If 
so, it would be better to disclose it than to produce a result that smacks so 
strongly of gratuitous judicial legislation. Or it may be that Mr. Justice 
Black figures that when he withdraws from the constitutional level he has 
done his duty and may proceed to exercise judicial power freely. If so, he 
has stopped far short of the ideal he seemed headed for-complete legis-
lative control over economic legislation. Or it may be that once he ac-
cords supremacy to Congress in eliminating trade barriers he is not in-
clined to be parsimonious in finding that Congress has exercised that pow-
er. If so, he is unconsciously forcing Congress to the lengths it had to go 
in the old days in order to permit state action-specific grants of concur-
rent jurisdiction.s3 
THE ALLEN-BRADLEY CASE 
The strange nature of the Renovated Butter case is easily seen when it is 
compared with Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Bd.54 There the Court unanimously upheld part of the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Peace Act55 against the claim that it conflicted with the Wagner 
Act.s6 The Wisconsin board had enjoined striking employees of the Allen-
Bradley plant from mass picketing, threatening employees, obstructing 
factory entrances, and the like. This was within the power of the board 
under the Wisconsin statute which declared such activities unfair labor 
practices by employees. In rejecting the argument of a conflict with the 
Wagner Act, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, made four 
points. First, he confined the issue to the precise facts involved, and thus 
by-passed any conflict with other provisions of the state act not required 
to support the order before the Court. Likewise, he rejected the claim that 
because under the state act the strikers lost their status as employees, 
there was an inconsistency with their status under the Wagner Act. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court had observed that the board had not denied 
52 Se~ Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Polk v. Glover, 305 U.S. s, 16 (1938). 
5J I do not mean to imply that the dissenters did not have their own set of values to aid 
in finding no conflict. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for example, has long since served notice that 
his respect for state police power is such that he requires a clear and unambiguous showing that 
Congress meant fully to exercise its power at the expense of the states. See Federal Trade 
Com'n v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349 (1941), noted in so Yale L. J. 1294 (1941); Kirsch-
baum v. Walling, 62 S. Ct. 1n6, III9 (1942). 
54 62 S. Ct. 82o (1942). 
55 Wis. Stat. (1939) c. III. 
56 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1941). 
HeinOnline  -- 10 U. Chi. L. Rev. 38 1942-1943
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 
employee status in the order, and this, Mr. Justice Douglas held, was con-
clusive. Second, reliance was placed on the fact that the National Labor 
Relations Board had not acted. Third, he noted that Congress had given 
no mdication of an intention to pre-empt the field and to make its action 
exclusive in all respects. And finally, he was unable to see how the action 
of the state officials "impaired, diluted, qualified or in any respect sub-
tracted from" rights guaranteed by the Wagner Act.s7 
If the arguments here are turned back on the Renovated Butter situa-
tion, a conclusion of no conflict in that case can be reached. There, it will 
be remembered, the case came up on stipulation. There was no attempt to 
analyze the actual facts to see whether in that specific case an incon-
sistency really existed. Had this been done, possible difficulties might 
have melted away as quickly as did unapplied portions of the Wisconsin 
act in the Allen-Bradley case.58 Nor in the Alabama case was there any 
evidence that federal officials had rushed in to act at cross-purposes with 
the state officials.59 True, there was not complete aloofness, for general 
jurisdiction was exercised over the renovating plant. But this could hard-
ly be decisive. The result in the Allen-Bradley case would hardly be 
changed if the company had to :file reports with the NLRB and had to al-
low periodic inspections of the factory to see if anti-union posters adorned 
the walls. Also usable against the conflict in the butter situation is the 
argument that no intention to pre-empt the field was manifested by Con-
gress. The only difference is that in the butter situation no evidence of in-
tention existed whereas in the labor case there was some evidence of a de-
sire to preserve some state power.6° Finally, the butter instance does not 
look very much like a situation where rights guaranteed by the Renovated 
Butter Act were "impaired, diluted, qualified or subtracted from." The 
only possible right was a right not to have butter seized by state officials. 
But that was the ultimate question to be decided.6x In general, the two 
sr Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 62 S. Ct. 82o, 826 (1942). 
sa For example, it was not shown whether the company was fully complying with all federal 
regulations, whether the federal regulations effectively dealt with the problem, or whether the 
methods of detection available under the federal statute effectively prevented impure packing 
stock from being sold as renovated butter. 
59 Mr. Chief Justice Stone stated in dissent that actually there had been active cooperation 
between state and federal officials generally. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 
148, 173-74 (1942). 
6• Actually, the dissenters asserted that what legislative history there was indicated that 
concurrent jurisdiction existed. Ibid., at 172. 
6• To make the analogy exact, the rights subject to impairment were consumers' rights, for 
they are to processors as employees are to employers. From this point of view, consumers' 
rights are apparently more likely to be impaired if the Alabama statute goes than if it stays. 
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situations, while not absolutely parallel, are close enough to demonstrate 
the interchangeability of legal argument. 
Interchangeability may be further shown by taking the arguments 
from the butter situation and applying them in the labor case. Again it 
will be remembered, the argument of Mr. Justice Reed was reduced to the 
proposition that the statutes conflicted because some federal official some-
time might disagree with a state official as to what were impure ingredi-
ents. A literal application of this is not possible because in the labor case 
no single fact would be crucial to both agencies. · But by analogy the rea-
soning may be used. The Wagner Act preserves the right to bargain col-
lectively. Has part of that bargaining strikers engage in the activities de-
nounced by the Wisconsin Labor Board, an eventual order of the NLRB 
attempting to restore the status quo might be ineffective because in the 
meantime the union had been broken. Even if the NLRB used its full 
power to destroy any advantage gained by what could in effect be strike-
breaking by the Wisconsin board, the time lost and the difficulties in-
volved would constitute interference with the Wagner Act. This is, no 
doubt, an exaggerated analogy. Yet such a method of demonstrating a 
conflict is of the same order as that used in the Renovated Butter case. 
If arguments like these can be thrown around fairly easily, it becomes 
evident that something new must be added to get a differentiation be-
tween the labor case and the butter case. Mr. Justice Douglas asserted by 
indirection that control in the butter situation was more "pervasive." 
Some employers who have fallen afoul of the Wagner Act may raise an 
eyebrow at this distinction. Be that as it may, "pervasiveness" hardly 
discloses the argument. If Congress has plenary power over an activity it 
can supersede state action or not, as it wishes. Then "pervasive" must 
mean that congressional intention to supersede state action is found solely 
from the scope of action provided for. But even this hides a premise. H 
ordinary state police power is impinged on, as in keeping the streets clear, 
or if the connection with national commerce is not too obvious, as in labor 
relations, then more complete congressional coverage is needed to make 
the control look "pervasive" than might be the case with a statute regu-
lating a clearly interstate subject such as transportation. If this is so, then 
the underlying political philosophies of the justices spring up again as im-
portant factors to be considered.62 And when these come in, lesser political 
issues may play their part. Just as it is possible to speculate on a fight be-
tween state and federal officials over renovated butter,63 so is it possible to 
6• See note 53 supra. 
63 Seep. 37 supra. 
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raise the possibility that some justices felt that the NLRB would be more 
secure if states were not deprived of the power to interdict labor policies 
which many people deplore. In fact, the very technique employed by the 
Court64-that of limiting its decision to the precise order before it-may 
be an indication that a careful line of distinction will be followed, designed 
to protect vital parts of the Wagner Act at the same time that minor 
scraps are tossed to less labor-minded state legislatures. Whatever ulti-
mate reasons explain the Allen-Bradley decision, the fact remains that 
simple statements that the Court follows congressional intent are neither 
the whole story, nor perhaps the chief element. 
HINES V. DA VIDOWITZ 
Although not a Commerce Clause case, Hines v. Davidowitz65 serves the 
purpose of demonstrating how small a part congressional intent can play 
when large issues are at stake. And if the issue is important enough, a lit-
eral conflict between state and federal acts is unnecessary. In the David-
owitz case the Court knocked out a Pennsylvania alien registration act66 
solely because Congress also had one.67 There was no conflict. Aliens in 
Pennsylvania could register annually, pay an annual registration fee, 
carry an identification card, present it on proper demand, all without in-
terfering in any way with federal registration. Any conflict must be 
spelled out by implying that Congress pre-empted the :field. This the 
Court did by a mixture of semiconstitutional exalting of federal power 
over foreign relations and judicial expansion of the scope and purpose of 
the federal registration law. Mr. Justice Black, who wrote the majority 
opinion, demonstrated in his usual forthright manner that the legal rules 
of pre-emption were meaningless. After pointing out that previous opin-
ions had used many different words to express the reason for invalidity of 
a state statute, the justice went on to observe that "none of these expres-
sions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitu-
tional yardstick." "In the :final analysis," he said, "there can be no one 
crystal clear, distinctly marked formula. "68 There was good reason for him 
to take this broad, sophisticated view of the subject, for under the tradi-
64 See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), a 5-4 decision, where Mr. Justice Douglas 
strongly protested against the majority's technique of circumscribing the issue before it so as 
not to find a conflict between a state statute and, the Bankruptcy Act. 
6s 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
66 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1941) tit. 35, §§ 18o1-6. 
67 54 Stat. 673 (1940), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 451-6o (1942). 
68 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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tional rules of conflicts he might have been hard put to :find an exact paral-
lel. Only by looking at the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" 
could a reason for invalidity be spelled out. 
It is clear at once that Mr. Justice Black's rule here is much broader 
than that of the Renovated ~utter case. In fact, the rule cuts both ways, 
because it would frequently be an easy matter to look at a "full purpose" 
of Congress and make an apparent conflict vanish. In the Renovated But-
ter case, for example, the "full purpose" approach could lead to a conclu-
sion that Congress was interested in pure food and obviously would not 
wish to hamper state seizures not available to federal inspectors. 
In line with his "full purpose" rule, Mr. Justice Black approached 
Hines v. Davidowitz in the grand manner. In contrast to Mr. Justice 
Reed's narrow, specific comparison of the workings of federal and state 
pure food statutes, Mr. Justice Black started with a discussion of federal 
power over international relations, of which the method of treatment of 
other countries' nationals is "important and delicate." His discussion of 
the supremacy of federal power in this field makes it clear that any state 
legislation is grudgingly tolerated, and that the smallest peep out of Con-
gress forecloses all state action. When the justice turned his attention to 
the specific acts before him, he was well prepared for finding incompatibil-
ity. He could not :find a literal conflict, but he could :find that Congress 
left its provisions lenient in the interests of personal freedom and hence 
the "full purpose" indicated disapproval of stringent state laws. Without 
question this can be called determination of congressional intent by at-
tenuation. This is partly explained, of course, by the important premise 
of the supremacy of federal power over international relations.69 But it 
also indicates that in all likelihood one factor was a dislike of what was ad-
mittedly a pretty reprehensible state law.70 In fact, so delicately inter-
woven are arguments of congressional intent and the great personal free-
doms so valiantly upheld in civil liberties cases, that it almost seems as if 
the state statute was unconstitutional ab initio, but so declared by Con-
gress, not the Court. As with Mr. Justice Reed's desire' for untrammelled 
commerce, the result is a double judicial constitutional policy-a high re-
gard for federal supremacy in foreign affairs and for civil liberties-pre-
69 Justices Black and Douglas have indicated elsewhere their views on international rela-
tions; see their concurring opinion in Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 3II U.S. 470, 
490 (1941); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); and see Mr. Justice Douglas' use of 
this point in distinguishing the Davidowitz case. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 62 S. Ct. 82o, S:zs (1942). 
1• See the strong disapproval expressed by the district court. Davidowitz v. Hines, 30 F. 
Supp. 470, 477 ( Pa. 1939). 
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sented in the words of Congress. One might be tempted to say that Con-
gress becomes the Charlie McCarthy of the Supreme Court. 7x 
THE GULF OIL CASE 
Even though Congress may not be specific in outlawing conflicting 
state legislation, it may imply its disapproval so strongly that the Court 
is a faithful interpreter of congressional intent when striking down state 
legislation. In this situation the Court will not intrude with its own con-
ception of proper public policy unless it refuses to :find an intent to elimi-
nate state action. True, this is saying no more than that the whole federal 
field is a matter of degree from specific prohibition to vague general infer-
ence of intent to prohibit, and that as the federal legislation comes closer to 
specificity, the area of the Court's freedom is narrowed. In so far as the 
several members of the Court have theories as to what is evil about trade 
barriers, for example, they will differ in their choice of points along the 
scale at which they :find sufficient implication to accept prohibition. Nev-
ertheless, a point may be reached where the Court is unanimous in :finding 
implied prohibition, and where outside observers may agree that the 
Court has probably divined congressional will with precision. Such an in-
stance is McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp.72 
This was one of the several cases involving the New York City sales 
tax. 73 Most of the impositions of the tax were upheld against a contention 
that interstate commerce was burdened,74 but in the Gulf Oil case Con-
gress turned the trick and deprived New York City of its levy. In this 
case, the tax was on a sale of fuel oil for ships' stores, that is, for use by 
ships as fuel. The oil had been imported from Venezuela, held under bond 
and federal supervision, processed to make it suitable as ships' fuel, and 
then sold to vessels engaged in foreign commerce. The important factors 
relied on by the Court were the various statutes and regulations protect-
1• Compare the language of the dissenting justices: "At a time when the exercise of the 
federal power is being rapidly expanded through Congressional action, it is difficult to overstate 
the importance of safeguarding against such diminution of state power by vague inferences as 
to what Congress might have intended if it had considered the matter or by reference to our 
own conceptions of a policy which Congress has not expressed and which is not plainly to be 
inferred from the legislation which it has enacted." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 75 
(1941). 
7• 309 u.s. 414 (1940). 
73 N.Y. J;..oc. L. No. 25 (1934). 
74 See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), and companion 
cases: McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940); McGoldrick v. Compagnie 
Generale, 309 U.S. 430 (1940). 
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ing such oil from taxation.75 No import duty had to be paid, and by regu-
lation no levy, process, or taxation could be had while the oil was in a 
bonded warehouse. The purpose of all this was clearly shown to be a solici-
tude for oil companies which had to compete with foreign oil companies 
for commerce in fuel oil. 
Even with all this background, there is no specific congressional pro-
hibition of a sales tax. Relief from an import duty does not compel relief 
from all other taxes. Nor does a regulation forbidding taxation on oil in a 
warehouse necessarily hit the tax on the sale made upon removal. Yet the 
cumulative effect of congressional protection leads to a conclusion that a 
sales tax cannot be tolerated. At the time Congress acted, it presumably 
embraced all the likely interferences common then. If so, its failure to an-
ticipate a new tax should not vitiate its primary purpose ,of freeing oil 
companies from competitive burdens. Otherwise, state and nation could 
play ducks and drakes so long as legal ingenuity held out. Once it be-
comes clear that the federal regulation was aimed at furthering a national 
policy of competition in foreign commerce, 76 it requires no artificial reason-
ing or high-flown generalization to recognize the danger of permitting 
state taxes to thwart the very result Congress sought to obtain. 
One can undoubtedly argue that all this talk about congressional pur-
pose relative to fuel oil does not differ one whit from congressional purpose 
to regulate the manufacture of renovated butter or the registration of 
aliens. If this is true, it shows that almost any time the Court implies that 
Congress intended to block state legislation, the result is obtained only by 
the Court's independent judgment of the desirability of finding such an 
implication. But if there is a difference in the types, the distinguishing 
feature must be one which partially eliminates the Court's exercise of its 
own predilections. Such a distinction can perhaps be spelled out. In the 
Gulf Oil case, the purpose of congressional regulation was to free fuel oil 
from any burden. State taxes would thwart this. But in both the Renovat-
ed Butter and Davidowitz situations, Congress imposed a burden and the 
state imposed a similar burden. If the state statute in the Gulf Oil case 
provided that no tax should be levied on fuel oil, a closer analogy to the 
other cases would exist. Or if state statutes said renovating plants could 
not be inspected except by state officials or that local aliens could not be 
1s Int. Rev. Code, 53 Stat. 414, 415, 419 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3422, 3430, 3451 (1940); Tariff 
Act of 1930,46 Stat. 69o (1931), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1309 (1937); Customs Reg., art. 942 (1931). 
76 It should be noted that a policy of furthering competition is not an argument that can be 
used in the case of renovated butter. Though part of the purpose of those regulations is to 
suppress impure products, part of the purpose is probably to discourage the sale of renovated 
butter. The state statute aids, not hinders, this objective. 
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registered by anyone, a closer analogy to the Gulf Oil case could be found. 
Still it must be admitted that slight variations in statutes can show a 
breakdown in this distinction. What, for example, would be the status of 
a state statute requiring state inspection of bonded fuel oil to prevent its 
untaxed sale within the state for local consumption, or which taxed fuel 
for ships' stores if the federal regulations were not complied with? One 
can agree that some state statutes are more likely to fall than others; one 
can agree that personal preferences of judges will be. less influential in 
some cases than in others. But so long as the door is open for preferences, 
lines of demarcation designed to separate those cases where preferences 
prevail from those where logical implementation of congressional purpose 
prevails are hard to draw, if not wholly illusory.n 
THE POSSIBILITY OF SOLUTIONS 
The question may be raised, of course, whether one is to deplore the 
fact that in the federal field judicial predilection has raised its head again. 
In the old days, predilections in the constitutional realm were deplored 
because no one could offset the results reached. Obviously this is not the 
case in the federal field where Congress has the last word. Yet there was 
another objection to the course of events in constitutional cases. So long 
as people could say with reason that "due process of law is what the Su-
preme Court likes or dislikes," no one could know what the law was likely 
to be except by astute delving into the probable predilections of the sev-
eral justices. That criticism obtains in some measure today. Still another 
objection can be made. The old fights of state against nation were largely 
smoke screens to hide an attempt by some private interest to invoke the 
aid of the Court in combating public regulation. In large measure, this is 
the case today. Few people take cases to the Supreme Court in order to 
find the answer to some abstract question of political theory. Usually re-
lief from a-burden is sought. The Court may easily be a party to enabling 
a private interest to escape a state regulation which the Federal Govern-
ment actually does not oppose. There is less permanence in the Court's 
decision because Congress can set the matter right, but an interval may 
exist during which regulation is in abeyance. Finally, one may be less im-
pressed by protestations that the Court no longer toys with legislative 
policy in the constitutional realm when it looks suspiciously as if that is 
what happens in the federal field. 78 
nIt is worth while to add that this general problem exists also when the Court is engaged 
in construing federal statutes. See Hamilton and Braden, op. cit. supra note* at 1357-67. 
78 Of course, there are those who believe that the Court still dabbles in policy when it 
measures statutes affecting civil liberties by a standard different from that used for statutes 
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If, then, the present tendency is to be deplored, the question is whether 
the tendency is inevitable. Clearly not. The rule could be that state 
statutes retain their force unless specifically outlawed by federal regula-
tion. But this would be intolerable. Congress could not be asked to an-
ticipate all possible legislative conflicts, nor could it really solve the prob-
lem by blanket prohibition. In some instances a tag end proviso nullifying 
all state statutes "conflicting with this act" would only restate the prob-
lem. Some leeway must be left. Judge Hutcheson offered a neat rule in 
his lower court opinion in the Renovated Butter case. 79 He said there must 
be "such an essential conflict between state and federal laws and regula-
tions as that compliance with the one is defiance of the other."8" This is 
definite, and largely free from lurking ambiguity in which a personal pref-
erence might be hidden. Yet it would not cover the Gulf Oil case. Where 
federal policy is to avoid all burdens, Judge Hutcheson's rule would appar-
ently throw on Congress the responsibility of specific prohibition. 8x 
A long step forward can be made by requiring the United States to take 
a position. If there is doubt whether federal and state statute should both 
remain, the executive arm of the United States may be able to provide the 
answer. In the Renovated Butter case, for instance, the Court would have 
appeared a little unrealistic if the solicitor of the Department of Agricul-
ture had filed a brief disclaiming any conflict. On the other hand, as in the 
Davidowitz case, a brief in opposition to continuation of a state statute 
serves as evidence of federal disapproval of state power. 82 That the admin-
istrative arm offers the opposition is immaterial. Courts have long relied 
on nonlegislative aids in determining the legislator's intent. 83 Further-
more, federal supremacy in a field need not mean congressional supremacy 
affecting economic and social liberties. See Hamilton and Braden, op. cit. supra note * at 
134<)-52; Lerner, Ideas Are Weapons, 66-68 (1939); Commager, N.Y. Times, § 6, p. 16, col. 
S (Mar. 30, 1941). 
79 n6 F. (2d) 227 (C.C.A. sth, 1941). 8• Ibid., at 232. 
81 It is only fair to state that Judge Hutcheson protected himself by also interdicting state 
statutes where "there is in effect an express prohibition against state regulation ..... " Ibid. 
A lot of leeway can be found in the words "in effect." 
8
• In the Allen-Bradley case the United States filed a brief denying any conflict. Note also 
that in the Brown case, discussed in note go infra, the Court requested the Solicitor General 
to file a brief as amicus curiae, and to make an oral argument if he wished. 
8J See, for example, United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940); 
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933); Paul, Use and 
Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 Yale L.J. 66o, 662-63, nn. 12, 13 
(1940); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398,408 et seq. 
(1941). 
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alone. The executive has policy-making power, and if the Court really 
seeks to step away from policy determination it can do no better than use 
the executive's judgment where Congress has been half silent. This is 
especially true where, as in the Renovated Butter case, the only possible 
conflict arises in the administration of two ostensibly compatible statutes. 
Naturally, the executive may have no interest in a self-executing statute 
such as the Bankruptcy Act. If it is too much to require the Government 
to take a stand in this situation, it is only because no vital public interest 
is involved. But notwithstanding an absence of executive concern, the 
legal officers of the sovereign United States could justifiably be required to 
state whether the supremacy of Congress is threatened. The Court need 
not articulate its deference to executive judgment; it can hardly remain 
aloof from mundane questions of legislative policy without heeding the 
executive's argument. 
Objections galore can be offered to this proposal. One may ask what 
strength a federal statute has if a supine administrative arm disclaims con-
flict or if a reactionary executive argues conflict in order to defeat state 
regulation. That question betrays a belief that the Court should fight to 
preserve "good" statutes against sabotage by the wrong executive. If the 
Court should do that much, it ought as well to throw off the cloak of ab-
stinence and devote itself wholeheartedly to the "right and the good" at 
all times. The last time that happened an Unpacking Bill was forthcom-
ing. Of like quality is the cry that the Court must not abdicate to the 
executive. But wherein lies the distinction between abdicating to the leg-
islature and abdicating to the executive? If the Court professes to do no 
more than preserve federal supremacy in the name of Congress, it could 
do worse than rely on the advice of the sovereign-in-action with an every-
day touch on the affairs of government. One may also assert that in so far 
as Congress has become in some instances a mouthpiece for the Court's 
policy, reliance on executive advice means in tum that within limits con-
gressional words have their real meaning given to them by the executive. 
In many ways, perhaps, this is the wave of the future anyway, and cer-
tainly there are those who wish it were truer today than it is. 84 Be that as 
it may, if Congress. must be a mouthpiece-and it must where it has not 
spoken its own mind unequivocally, but has left an ambiguity unresolv-
able by "pure logic"-it is no difficult choice between Court and executive 
84 See Laski, The American Presidency (r94o); Herring, Presidential Leadership (r94o); 
Clark, The Function of Law in a Democratic Soci~ty, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 393, 4or-4o3 
~~- . 
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as the competent voice. Administration is legislation in action, and the 
man who creates the action can better pass on possible impediments than 
"outsiders without special competence."8s 
IS THIS THE GRAND ILLUSION? 
There is much to be said for the proposition that regardless of a man's 
desire not to stir in the wrong cauldron, the atmosphere of the Court, the 
tradition of power, and the sense of security all tend to encourage the most 
reluctant to go afield and do what they can to help good govetnment 
along. The present bench has made a fair bid to withstand the pressure of 
prestige. Indeed, the auspices under which they took command necessi-
tated retreat. Perhaps the passage of time has weakened resistance and 
slowly but inevitably the force of the institution has gained the upper 
hand. If it has, the area is admittedly narrowed, for absolute prohibition 
on government action has been replaced by prohibition by implications 
and presumptions that can be overturned. Revolution in the Court still 
obtains on the broad front. Any retreat which has taken place is in small 
sectors. 
It must be admitted, however, that full retreat is impossible. No mat-
ter how specific Congress is, no matter how much reliance is placed on 
administrative advice, no matter how much a judge leans over backward, 
decision cannot be certain or questions free from doubt. There is always 
one inarticulate premise, that full social and economic outlook of a man, 
which lurks in every ratiocination. No amount of conscious attempt at 
submergence will ever produce total blackout. "If men were angels," 
Jerome Frank quotes, "no government would be necessary."86 They are 
not. But, as he points out, the really important thing is that fallibility be 
realized, that men act with an awareness of it. 87 Likewise here, the impor-
tant question is whether the present justices realize the extent to which 
they have created new areas in which they can exert power.88 If they are 
8s Railroad Com'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941). 
86 ''If Men Were Angels" is the title of Judge Frank's recent book on administrative law. 
The source is the Federalist No. 51. 
87 Frank, If Men Were Angels, c. I (1942). 
as Strictly speaking this is not a new phenomenon. "Seldom does Congress explicitly nega-
tive the further application of state laws ...•. While this issue is referred to the intention of 
Congress, it is apparent that as a rule it is the court that is doing the intending .•... The 
court has drawn its lines where it has drawn them because it has thought it wise to draw them 
there." Powell, Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Police Power, 
I9Io-I914 II, 22 Col. L. Rev. 28,48 (1922); Powell, Current Conflicts between the Commerce 
Clause and State Police Power, 1922-1927, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 6o7, 63o-32 (1928). For historical 
treatment see Federal Supremacy and the Davidowitz case, 29 Geo. L. J. 755 (1941). 
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aware of what they do, they have not said so.89 It is just possible (but 
hardly probable) that their bold frontal attack on constitutional usurpa-
tion of legislative power has created a grand illusion, and the new exer-
cise of legislative power passes unnoticed. 
It is at least fair to say that in the past few years the Due Process 
Clause has ambled right out of the United States Reports, at least so far 
as economic legislation is concerned; and the Commerce Clause, as a limi-
tation on legislation, is only a shadow of its former self. In their place is a 
newcomer-the federal field doctrine. This newcomer bears watching. 
The legislatures of Alabama, Pennsylvania, and New York can testify that 
he packs a powerful wallop. Other legislatures may soon join the wailing 
wal1.9o Before the Court was changed, reformers urged that something 
had to be done because "you can't teach an old dog new tricks." To this 
must be added a new comment: "You can't keep a new dog from learning 
the old tricks." 
89 I suppose that, as in so many things, all is not black and white, and that the sharp lines 
we attempt to draw must always be blurred in footnotes. Much is being made of United States 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 S. Ct. 581 (1942). Walter Kennedy, that arch critic of the 
"realists" and "psychologists"-in whose company I suspect he would place me-accepts it 
that the justices who wrote the principal opinions in that case were intent on keeping the 
Court from being a superlegislature. Kennedy, The Bethlehem Steel Case-A Test of the New 
Constitutionalism I., II Ford.L. Rev. 133, 157-62 (1942). On thesurfacetheresultin that case 
is at war with the well-known views of most of the majority justices, and would seem to belie 
the picture I have sought to draw. I am inclined to doubt, however, that the case need be 
taken at face value. Rather than believe that the justices felt bound by the law I think the 
majority probably felt that any adequate policy of wartime contract control would be better 
brought about by warning Congress to act positively, than by leaving the executive to ask 
the Court to pull the chestnuts out. Be that as it may, I cheerfully concede that most jurists 
try to be at least a little aloof. This in itself is enough to establish a blurred picture. 
9• California may be next. In Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (Cal. 1941), a statutory 
three-judge court by a vote of 2-1 invalidated a California proration program for raisins 
because it burdened interstate commerce. After the argument on appeal, the Supreme Court 
ordered reargument and requested the parties "to discuss the questions whether the state 
statute involved is rendered invalid by the action of Congress in passing the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act .... the Agricultural Adjustment Act as amended .... or any other Act of Congress." 
Parker v. Brown, 62 S. Ct. 1266, 1267 (1942). 
